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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE WARRANTY SOLUTIONS
TO ART FRAUD AND FORGERY
The sale of fine art annually accounts for an estimated 300 to 400
million dollars of commercial transactions. An estimated one to 10 per-
cent of that total is the subject of fraud.' Although the exact degree of
fraud in the fine art market may never be known.2 it is clear that con-
sumers of art are in need of protection 3
Schemes to reduce the incidence of forgery have been advanced by
art dealers, legislators, and members of the legal profession. But measures
to prevent art forgery can give only partial protection. The law must
provide an effective civil remedy to redress the defrauded purchaser
when preventive measures have failed.
This Note will examine the practical and theoretical impediments to
successful civil redress 4 and will suggest means by which the warranty
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code may be applied to tainted
art transactions.
1. L. JEPPsoN, TiH FABULOUS FRAUDs 290 (1970) [hereinafter cited as L. JEPPsoN]
supports a one percent figure; R. A~iEs, FAXERY IN PAINTING AND ScNiTinric EX rPi=S
(1965) estimates 10 percent. See also Colin & Easby, Legal Aspects of Forgery and
Protection of the Expert, 26 Builrm oF TiE METOPOLirAN MusEUM or ART 258 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Colin & Easby].
2. The inexactitude arises from the difficulty in the detection and proof of art forgery
and from the reluctance of the defrauded purchaser to report or prosecute a fraud for
fear of labelling himself a dupe and advertising his purchase as -worthless for resale or
donative tax deduction.
3. Thomas Wurtenberger, Director of the Institute of Cruinology and Penology of
the Umversity of Freidburg, Germany, believes that far too many purchasers enter the
market ill-equipped to cope with its complexities, and that their desire to reflect social
and financial accomplishments often supersedes any cautious aesthetic appraisal of their
prospective purchase. See Wurtenberger, Criminal Damage to Art-A Crimnological
Study, 14 DEPAur. L. Rxv. 83 (1964).
Those who seek a profitable financial investment frequently are deceived by their
opinion of what will be in vogue, without giving full consideration to the vagaries and
inconsistencies of the public's view as formulated by fashionable critics and galleries. In
an interview with Ralph Colin and Gilbert Edelson, April 19, 1972, the author was told
that the percentage of works which actually realize a significant investment return is
mimmal. Hence, the public is being informed inaccurately by the numerous articles in
the media which inflate investment potential. Due to changing tastes and interests, the art
market is so prone to fluctuation that only knowledgeable market observers are qualified
to think in terms of investment.
4. Criminal prosecution of a forger or fraudulent seller also raises serious difficulties.
To be successful, the work's lack of authenticity must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, and it must also be shown that the dealer knew of the defect but made no indica-
tion of it in his representations to the purchaser. Even where the dealer returns the
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CHARACTERISTICS OF ART FORGERY
An attorney who represents the purchaser of art must have an under-
standing of the methods and materials of the art forger.5 There are
five0 basic methods of art forgery- forging signatures and supporting
documentation;7 forging specific original works; utilizing the style
of a known artist without copying an existing work, completing un-
finished works; and, pastiche, or combining diverse compositional ele-
ments from original paintings to produce "new" compositions which
are attributed to the artist.8 It is readily apparent that artistic compe-
purchase price to an unwary purchaser of a forgery, the dealer cannot be prosecuted
successfully without a showing of scienter. The difficulty involved in proving scienter
is obvious. One noted authority has observed that proof of fraud is particularly difficult
where the forgery is unusually deceptive; in such a case, the dealer probably could
assert a successful defense by claiming that he, also, was deceived. G. SAVAGE, FORGERIES,
FAKS, AND REPRODUCONs 20 (1969) [hereinafter cited as G. SAVAGE].
Florence Shientag notes: "Because of the high stakes, traffickers in art frauds are
willing to assume the risk of detection, and unfortunately, successful prosecutions
[are] rare." Sientag, Some Legal Aspects of Art and Fake Art, 54 WOMEN LAWYERS J.
23, 25 (1968). In the United States criminal sanctions seldom are imposed. Neither state
criminal codes nor federal statutes recognize art forgery as a distinct offense. Id.
'5. For purposes of this Note, focus will be limited to painting, the media most fre-
quently exploited by art forgers.
6. This list is not intended to be conclusive. There is authority for acceptance of other
categories of art forgery, including duplicates done by the master himself. One author
has noted:
Questions of authenticity are sometimes raised by the frequent phenomenon
of duplicates from the same hand, which are of course distinct from copies
by another person. In former times, artists did not hesitate to produce
replicas of their work. But today such repetitions are regarded as unac-
ceptable. Hans Gross, Professor of Criminal Law at the University of
Czernowitz, designates all duplicates of works of art as, "from a juristic
standpoint" forgeries.
Such duplicates are m general repudiated by connoisseurs and described
as a variety of forgery It is usually maintained that there can be only one
original work by an artist and that all subsequent productions of a similar
character are imitations.
S. SCHtLLER, FORGERS, DEALEs, AND ExPERTs, 156-57 (1960)
7. Signatures may be forged with relative ease. In a letter to the New Statesman,
August 20, 1938, Lucien Pissaro stated that he saw one of his paintings that was signed
with a forgery of his father's signature offered for sale. Legal intervention failed and the
painting was sold as the work of Camille Pissaro. See also 0. Kuaz, FAXES: A HANBooK
FOR COLLEcrORS AND) S-ruDENrs, 46 (1948).
8. Prior to the middle half of the nineteenth century, masters often employed appren-
tices m their studios. The question occasionally arose whether the finished product was
wholly the work of the master or was executed in part by an employee. Backgrounds
and draperies were often the products of these assistants. "The buyer at the time was
under no illusion as to the nature of the artist's purpose, and did not demand that he
should carry out every operation with his own hand. [Tihe signature was not the
hallmark of gemnus; it was the trademark of the studio." G. SAVAGE, supra note 4, at 2.
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tence and technical proficiency are necessities in the forgery of works
of art. Likewise, successful prosecution of an art forger requires a
commensurate degree of artistic expertise.
Authentication Procedures: Detection and Proof of Forgery
Distressing evidentiary problems are presented in civil actions for the
wrongful sale of fake art because of the difficulty in detecting and
proving art fraud. Authentication generally is accomplished by scientific
analysis, stylistic inquiry, and documentation. Scientific verification may
be the most important method of challenging authenticity and attribu-
tion, and technological analysis is usually the only means of elucidating
the problems relating to compositional materials and the effects of time
upon them. Thus, to insure any degree of success, the forger not only
must master the style of his predecessor, but also must make every at-
tempt to duplicate the original materials and processes.9
A painting is a layering of many materials. A material such as canvas
tacked to a wooden stretcher provides the support for subseqeunt layers
of the primer, pigments, and sealant. Any variation from the original
materials will facilitate detection. A forgery can be revealed if the
stretcher is not made of a wood used in the original artist's locale or if
its age is not contemporaneous with the date of the imitated work.
Though not an absolute test, wormholes are a frequent incident of age.
The kind of canvas used and the method in which it was woven also can
provide indicia of forgery.
The layers of pigment are particularly important in determining for-
gery through scientific processes. X-rays reveal otherwise invisible
layers of pigment, exposing structural coatings and supplementary color.
Luminescent photographs taken in ultraviolet light from quartz-tube
lamps reveal retouching and restorations in almost every type of mate-
rial. Infrared paints isolate various stages of construction, and spectro-
scopy provides a chemical analysis of pigments. Historically, pigments
were made from minerals and earth bases ground into a fine powder
and suspended in an oil or resin vehicle. Often, the dates of discovery
of various pigments have been recorded and, on occasion, have aided in
the authentication of disputed works.1
Evidence of age also may be found in craquelure, the web-like net-
work of small cracks which results from shrinkage and movement be-
9. See generally A. BURROUGHs, ART C~lrncism FROM A LABORATORY (1938).
10. See generally A. DEWU.D, T SEN-fic ExAmIAT o N OF Picrums (1929).
1972]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
tween the paint layers and sealant. The cracks may be the result of
temperature, handling, or faulty technique, as in over-painting before
the bottom layer has dried sufficiently But the presence of craquelure
is not an absolute test. As stated by Dr. Max Friedlander: "There exist
many genuine paintings which show no cracks; they are never absent
in forgeries." 11 In addition to scientific methods, detection of art fraud
also is possible through the stylistic analysis of experts. An authentic
painting is marked by the harmonious portrayal of all aspects of the
painting's subject. The trained eye would search for anachronisms in
costume, jewelry, and arclutecture. 12
Furthermore, the forger possesses his own instinctive artistic vocabu-
lary and is a product of his time. This point was articulated well in
Friedlander's On Art and Connoisseursbip: "Since every epoch acquires
fresh eyes, Donatello in 1930 looks different from what he did in 1870.
That which is worthy of imutation appears different to each generation.
Hence, whoever in 1870 successfully produced works 'by' Donatello
will find his performance no longer passing muster with the experts in
1930." 13
An analysis of artistic style is less precise than objective scientific
data and is subject to the usual distrust of expert opinion, but because
even the most talented and precise imitator cannot repress his own per-
sonality during the execution of a forgery, stylistic analysis remains a
viable test.
Another method of authentication utilizes documentation of the his-
tory of ownership and public exposure. This test is frequently unavail-
able because such documentation itself is often the subject of forgery or
is missmg entirely. Whatever method is used-scientific examination, styl-
istic analysis, or documentation-it must be remembered that the tests are
no better than those who interpret them.'4
Prevention of Art Forgery
Attempts to alleviate the problem of art forgery have arisen from a
variety of sources. One author' 5 has proposed that state art specialists
11. G. SAVAGE, supra note 4, at 209.
12. The importance of accessories and interior decoration cannot be over-estimated.
In a genuine work, all accessories and decoration must belong to a period not later than
the year of execution. Id.
13. M. FRLADER, ON ART AND CONNOSSETJRSHip 259 (1942).
14. See generally L. JEPPsoN, supra note 1, at 292.
15. Hodes, Fake Art and the Law, 27 FED. BJ. 73, 77 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Hodes].
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be licensed and granted a qualified immunity from prosecution for
defamation. Under this proposal, properly accredited experts could
advise prospective buyers that a certain piece is not an original without
fear of liability for defamation of the seller.16
A bill introduced by a New York congressman envisaged a federal
art archive supervised and administered by the Smithsonian Institute
Comittee.' The functions of the archive would include recordation of
certificates of authenticity filed by living arusts, photographs of their
work, and an owner's index.'
A three-year project was imtiated in 1968 by the Mellon Institute
to study and perfect the process of atomic fingerprinting of Old Mas-
ters.' 9 The project was made possible by $25,000 contributions from
both the National Gallery of Art and the Atomic Energy Commission.
Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, an organization minated in New
York, provides advice covering the entire scope of art-related legal
problems. The intricacies of copyright law have been examined in an
attempt to protect the artists' reproduction rights and to ascertain the
scope and effect of a publication of a work of art.2"
In the late 1960's, New York Attorney General Louis Lefkowitz
persuaded the New York Legislature to enact legislation2' designed to de-
fine and regulate the relationships among artists, dealers, art experts, and
purchasers of fine art.22 The law provides that, absent a clear and con-
spicuous disclaimer, any written bill of sale that identifies the work as
the product of a specific arust is deemed to be an express warranty of
genuineness.23 Illinois attempted to pattern art legislation after the New
York law, but the bill failed in the Illinois Senate.24
16. Fear of possible litigation is one reason for the reluctance of museums to have
their staffs give expert opinions. Ethical considerations also are important. Paid expertise
is frowned upon and considered ughly unethical. Staff members, being acadermc people
primarily, do not wish to be seen as helping make a sale or give the appearance of
offering investment counselling services. Also, such opimons generally are not based on
extended academic research. See Colin & Easby, supra note 1, at 260.
17. See Hodes, supra note 15, at 78.
18. id.
19. L. JEPpsoN, supra note 1, at 298.
20. See Jonakait, Do Art Exhibtions Destroy Common Law Copyright in Works of
Art?, 19 COPYRIGHT LAw SYMPosiUm 81 (1971).
21. N.Y. GEN. Bus. art 12, §§ 219 et seq. (1968).
22. Shientag, Some Legal Aspects of Art and Fake Art, 54 WoMEN LAWYERS J. 23,
25 (1968).
23. See Hodes, supra note 15, at 77.
24. Hodes, Wanted: Art Legislation for Illinois, 51 ILL. B.J. 218, 219 (1968) [herein-
after cited as Art Legislation].
19721
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Preventive measures such as those suggested above will do much to
encumber and discourage the forger, but they provide no solace to the
victim of an iniquitous sale;25 it is submitted that the Uniform Commer-
cial Code will supply the necessary civil remedy to compensate the
buyer of forged art.26 The following analysis will demonstrate that the
warranty provisions27 of the Code protect consumers of art both from
the seller who intentionally misrepresents a forged piece as an original,
and from the art dealer who innocently sells what he believes to be
an authentic work of art.
UCC § 2-313" EXPRESS WARRANTIES
The codification of express warranties in Code section 2-313 provides
a purchaser of fine art with a remedy that may be found to be dispositive
of almost every sale of fake art.28 A Florida court has defined express
warranty as "a statement or representation made by the seller of goods,
contemporaneously with, and as a part of the contract of sale, though
collateral to the express object of it, having reference to the character,
25. It is interesting to note that the legislation enacted in New York has been criti-
cized as a mere duplication of the protection provided by the Uniform Commercial Code.
Art Legislation, supra note 24, at 219. See also Colin, Reply, 65 ART NEws 6 (1966).
26. The applicability of Article 2 to the sale of works of art is clear. Section 2-102
defines the scope of Article 2 as applying to "transactions in goods." The term "goods"
is clarified in section 2-105 as "all things movable at the time of identification to
the contract."
27. Sections 2-313, 2-314, and 2-315 will be the subject of this Note. The warranty
of title provided by section 2-312 will not be considered; this warranty would not be
breached in the sale of art forgeries.
28. Section 2-313 provides that:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bar-
gain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to
the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of
the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall con-
form to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bar-
gain creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall
conform to the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller
use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a
specific intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the
value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's
opimon or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.
[Vol. 14:409
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quality, or title of the goods, and by which the seller promises or under-
takes to insure that certain facts are or shall be as he then represents
them." 21
The foundation of the express warranty provision is the core descnp-
tion.30 "A 1965 Chevrolet," "a pair of scissors," or "a Picasso," are ex-
amples of core descriptions. Essentially, the core description is that
quality of the subject matter of the sale to which the seller's perform-
ance must necessarily conform. Because it must be assumed that the
subject of every sales transaction is something describable, the core
description is so basic to the contract for sale that it never may be dis-
claimed.' In addition, the extent of the express warranty is dependent
upon the basis of the bargain. The drafters of the Code expressed a
belief that "all of the statements of the seller [become part of the basis
of the bargain] unless good reason is shown to the contrary." 3 2
Express warranties may arise regardless of the intention of the seller. 3
It is no defense that the seller made an assertion in good faith and with-
out knowledge of the falsehood or deceit.34 This protection is particu-
larly inportant for one who purchases from a museum or art dealer.
Another aspect of the right to recovery under section 2-313 also is
significant for the art trade. Recovery is not limited to the express
representations in the contract for sale3 5 For example, an express war-
ranty may arise by way of advertismg3 6 or use of catalogues. To create
29. Weimar v. Yacht Club Point Estates, 223 So. 2d 100, 104 (Fla. 1969).
30 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, Comments 1 & 4. See also Ganz, Ltmitation
of Liability Under the Sales Provision of the Uniform Commercial Code, 14 DEPAuL
L.J. 73, 76 (1964); Note, Implied and Express Warranties and Disclaimers Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 38 IND. L.J. 648, 652 (1963).
31. See Moss v. Gardner, 228 Ark. 828, 310 S.W 491 (1958).
32. UNIFovM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, Comment 8.
33. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313 (2).
34. City Mach. & Mfg. Co. v. A. & A. Mach. Corp., 4 UCC REP. SERv. 461, 464 (E.D.
N.Y. 1967).
35. It is not unusual for the transfer of a work of art to be evidenced merely by a
sales receipt. Such receipts frequently include nothing more than a general description
of the piece, the consideration paid, and the date of sale. The instrument would reflect
none of the language of either party, including oral representations that might have
given rise to warranties.
36. Randy Kitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399
(1962).
37. Weisz v. Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc., 67 Misc. 2d 1077, 325 N.Y.S.2d 576 (N.Y.
City Civ. Ct. 1971).
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such a warranty, the purchaser need only have knowledge of the af-
firmation or description contained therein and act accordingly A recent
decision 38 held that it is not essential that the advertisement set forth the
exact warranty asserted by the plamntiff purchaser; it is necessary only
that such material convey the "essential idea" underlying the claimed
warranty
Moveover, since the express warranty is not limited to the terms of
the contract, the precise time when representations are made is im-
material.39 This is significant in two respects. First, an advertisement
setting forth affirmations of fact or description may be viewed far in
advance of actual negotiations with the seller. Though removed in
time and space from the transfer of the goods, the advertisement may
well have been the motivating influence that induced the purchase; thus,
the advertisement has become part of the basis of the bargain. Secondly,
language used after the closing of a sale may become a modification of
the contract and need not be supported by additional consideration.
Subsequent assurance could arise through an exhibition of prior advertis-
mg or catalogue documentation if such facts were made known to a
purchaser after a sale.40
In addition to the warranty arising from such extrinsic materials, oral
representations by the seller may give rise to an express warranty The
fact that a contract is within the Statute of Frauds does not prevent
the proof of an oral warranty,41 because the Code does not require that
a written contract include all the material terms of the agreement.42
Thus, the warranties made by the seller may be proven by oral evidence,
and it is nimaterial that the writing or memo does not contain them.
Prior to the adoption of the Code, the parol evidence rule made it ex-
tremely difficult to prove agreements or representations not included
in the written contract. Under the Code, even though the parties have
intended the writing to be a final expression of their agreement with
respect to the terms included therein, evidence of consistent additional
terms from prior or contemporaneous oral agreements is adimssible
to explain or supplement the contract unless the writing is found to
have been intended as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of
38. Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1968).
39. UNIFORM CoMx.mClAL CODE § 2-313, Comment 7
40. Id.
41. 1 R. ANDERSON UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313:22 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter
cited as ANDERSoN].
42. UNIFORM COMMERCAL CODE § 2-201.
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the agreement; evidence of a course of dealing, usage of trade, or course
of performance is always admissible.43 An analysis of the creation of an
express warranty will further evidence the vitality of section 2-313 in
transactions involving art objects.
Affirmation of Fact or Promise: UCC § 2-313(1) (a)
Subsection (1) (a) of section 2-313 provides for the creation of -an
express warranty upon "any affirmation of fact or promise made by the
seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the
basis of the bargain " If, in fact, the goods do not conform to the
affirmation or promise, the warranty is breached. In the situation where
a seller makes an unequivocal assertion that a painting is "a Corot of
the finest quality supported by unimpeachable documentation," and, in
truth, the painting is a forgery that has escaped detection for a century,
the buyer's remedy is preserved by the section 2-313 (1) (a) express
warranty arising by way of affirmation of fact or promise.44
Expert opinion as to authenticity, although not absolute, also should be
regarded as an affirmation of fact within the meaning of section 2-313.
The seller of art, which possesses an established longevity exceeding the
life of its creator, is confronted with the evidentiary burden of establish-
ing a correct attribution. Attribution probably cannot be reduced to
an absolute because of the problem inherent in expert opinions. How-
ever, it is an accepted custom in the trade to value art on the basis of
expert opinion. It would seem only logical and equitable that if the
seller is supported by the benefits of something less than absolute, he
also should bear the burdens of something less than absolute. A state-
ment of authorship or authenticity should be viewed as an affirmation
of fact under section 2-313. This is not to say, however, that when it
is the seller who relies on expert opinion to effect a sale, he is without
any protection. He has recourse to the network of disclaimers em-
bodied in the Code.
One valuable benefit which would result from treating expert opinion
as an express warranty would be the measure of predictability which
would be injected into the commercial transaction; either the seller war-
rants the experts' opinion as his own or he disclaims the experts' sub-
jective analysis. Regardless of the seller's decision, a new perspective
would enhance the transaction by eliminating some of the uncertainty
The reasonable effect would be to protect the pecuniary value of art and
43. UxFORa/ ComMERCIAL CODE § 2-202 (b).
44. Cf. Jacobs Pharmacy Co. v. Gipson, 116 Ga. App. 760, 159 S.E.2d 171 (1967).
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to encourage the public to purchase more art with greater certainty of
receiving what was bargained for in addition to providing a readily avail-
able remedy if the piece is anything less than authentic.
In considering another aspect of the express warranty, it would seem
logical to find a breach of the section 2-313 (1) (a) affirmation or prom-
ise when the documentation alone has been forged. Such a breach would
render questionable the authorship of the painting,4 and the seller should
be required to reimburse the purchaser for any diminution in value
caused by the lack of certification or to compensate the purchaser for ex-
penses incurred in reasonably resolving the question of attribution
through scientific analysis or expert opinion. Punitive damages should
be allowed if the seller acted in bad faith.4
UCC § 2-313 (1) (b) Warranty by Description
A superficial reading would suggest that the warranty of description
merely duplicates the warranty by affirmation of fact. The additional
strength of the section 2-313 (1) (b) warranty, however, becomes ap-
parent when read in light of the. language of comment 5, there is no
limit on what may be considered a description. Technical specifications
and blueprints are included as examples of methods of establishing a
description which may be made part of the basis of the barga.4
Similarly, the results of a scientific analysis or an expert examination of
stylistic evidence would be within the scope of subsection (1) (b) and
comment 5
Warranties by description and by affirmation of fact are both subject
to the limitation of subsection (2) of section 2-313 which exempts a
seller's statement purporting to be his opinion or commendation of the
goods. Such "puffing" statements do not necessarily create an express
warranty The distinction between statements which are deemed noth-
ing more than the seller's opinion or judgment of the subject matter,
and those which are considered affirmations of the quality and condition
45. There is a major problem with documentation in the art sales process which may
be attributed to two factors: Since no procedure has been adopted for licensing art
experts, no clear criteria exist for establishing the credentials of such persons; moreover,
the quality of the documentation is not readily interpreted without recourse to another
"expert."
46. Beshears v. S-H-S Motor Sales Corp., 433 S.W.2d 66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968).
47. See, e.g., Fox Pools, Inc. v. Villarose, 77 York Leg. Rec. 165 (Pa. 1963), where a
purchaser specified the exact dimensions he desired for the construction of a swimming
pool. Upon a showing of non-conforming dimensions, the court ruled that the builder
had breached an express warranty.
[Vol. 14-409
ART FRAUD
of the thing sold, is exemplified by two early English cases involving
the sale of fine art which were cited by a New Jersey court in Wolcott
v. Mount.
48
The first case, Jendwme v. Slade,49 revolved a sale of two pictures;
the catalogue of the auction described one as a sea piece by Claude
Lorraine and the other a painting by Temers. It was held that no war-
ranty was made that the pictures were the genuine works of Lorraine
and Teniers. The court concluded that: "there being no way of trac-
ing the picture itself, it could only be a matter of opinion whether the
picture in question was the work of the artist whose name it bore. " 10
Po'wer v. Barba!51 involved a sale of four paintings described as "four
pictures, Views in Venice, Canaletto." 52 Distinguishing the Jendanne
case, the court found that since Canaletto was a comparatively modern
painter, the authenticity of his works was ascertainable. With respect
to the productions of very old masters, an assertion as to their genume-
ness was necessarily a matter of opinion. Miriam Cederbaumn0 3 suggests
that the distinction formulated in these early cases is still a viable
standard. It is interesting to note that "because of the nature of the art
it collects, the Museum of Modem Art does not normally encounter
problems of fraud and forgery This Museum usually acquires the works
of living artists. Such works are easy to authenticate through collabora-
tion with the artist himself." 5 4
EXCLUSION OF EXPRESS WARRANTY
Exammation of the Goods
Under "good faith" circumstances, an independent inspection of the
goods will not negate the section 2-313 express warranties. Furthermore,
absent suspicious circumstances, there is no requirement that the pur-
chaser initiate an examnation to verify the accuracy of the seller's repre-
sentation;55 it is sufficient that the purchaser believed it was true.5 6
48. 38 N.J.L. 496, 20 Am. R. 425 (Ct. Err. & App. 1875).
49. 170 Eng. Rep. 459 (Nisi Prius 1797).
50. Id. at 459.
51. 111 Eng. Rep. 865 (K3. 1836).
52. Id. at 865.
53. Miriam Cederbaum is associate counsel for the Museum of Modem Art, New
York.
54. Letter from Miriam Cederbaum to Richard DeYoung, March 27, 1972.
55. Umon Pipe & Mach. Ltd. v. Luria Steel & Trading Corp., 225 F.2d 829, 835 (6th
Cir. 1955); City Mach. & Mfg. Co. v. A. & A. Mach. Corp., 4 UCC REP. SERV. 461, 464-65
(ED.N.Y. 1967); Schwartz v. Gross, 93 Ohio App. 445, 114 N.E.2d 103 (1952).
56. City Mach. & Mfg. Co. v. A. & A. Mach. Corp., 4 UCC REP. SE-V. 461, 464-65
(E.D.N.Y. 1967).
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Where the purchaser knows that an express warranty extended by the
seller is false, however, the representation could not be considered part
of the basis of the bargain, and no warranty is created.57
To tempt the uncautious buyer, forgeries usually are offered at prices
below market value, but not so low that they are marked as spurious.
The mere fact that a sale is consummated for a price below market
value does not alone constitute notice sufficient to deny the buyer relief
for a claimed breach of warranty.58 However, equality in bargaining po-
sitions evidenced by a sophisticated purchaser, or the absence of docu-
mented pedigree, could be sufficient, when coupled with a low price, to
present a factual determination for a jury 5
Disclimer
General disclaimers of express warranty usually will be found to be
inoperative. Where general language of disclaimer conflicts with specific
express warranties, for example, Code section 2-316 (1) gives effect to
the express warranty Thus, when language used in a disclaimer seeks
to exclude "all warranties, express or implied," it will be effective only
if the seller can prove that no express warranty existed initially This
task is a difficult one because of the variety of representations which
give rise to express warranties. In addition, as noted earlier, the Code's
version of the parol evidence rule should, in most cases, permit intro-
duction of evidence of an oral or other extrinsic warranty 10 The courts
have demonstrated a dislike for general language of disclaimer. By re-
fusing to give effect to disclaimers, the courts can protect the art market
from the sophisticated but disreputable dealer who is armed with fake
and poor quality works of art and attempts to shield his despicable
practice with contracts resplendent with disclaimers.
The recent decision in Weisz v. Parke-Bernet Galleries6 illustrates
57. Id. at 465. See also General Electric Co. v. United States Dynamics, Inc., 403 F.2d
933 (1st Cir. 1968).
58. "To charge one with notice, 'the facts must be such as ordinarily to excite inquiry
with reference to the particular fact which inquiry is designed to elicit."' People v.
One 1933 Buick Sedan, 43 Cal. App. 2d 482, -, 111 P.2d 378, 380 (1941), quoting from
Zeller v. Milligan, 71 Cal. App. 617, 624, 236 P 349, 352 (1925). By analogy, inadequacy
of price alone rarely is sufficient to constitute nonce of defect in title unless the price
paid is merely nominal or absurdly low. Zweig v. Schwartz, 31 A.2d 857, 861 (D.C. Mun.
App. 1943) (purchase of $400 diamond ring for $75 did not constitute nonce).
59. UOmaoRaz CoMMzRCUL CODE S 2-316, Comment 8.
60. See niotes 41-43 supra, and accompanying text.
61. 67 Misc. 2d 1077, 325 N.Y.S.2d 576 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1971).
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the aversion to disclaimers generally held by courts. The defendant,
Parke-Bernet Galleries, had sold at auction two paintings which were
attributed to Raoul Dufy, but which were later discovered to be fakes.
Parke-Bernet had represented in its catalogue that the works were gen-
une and that documentation was available. Parke-Bernet argued, how-
ever, that all sales were "as is" and subject to the "Conditions of Sale"
contained in the catalogue. The mentioned "Conditions of Sale" in-
cluded a disclaimer of any warranty and a statement that purchasers
were bound by its terms. Two issues were presented: first, whether
the plaintiffs had knowledge of the disclaimer, and, if they did not,
whether they were legally chargeable with such knowledge. The sec-
ond issue was whether the disclaimer was effective to immunize Parke-
Bernet from the legal consequences that would normally follow where
a sale results from a representation of genuineness that subsequently is
found to have been totally inaccurate.6 2
In addressing the first question, the court noted that the provisions
of the "Conditions of Sale" were in small print. Though the disclaimer
was unequivocal in its terms, a "List of Artists" was included in the
catalogue with appropriate reference numbers to works offered for
sale. Descriptive material about the artists and works appeared through-
out the catalogue, including specific reference to the two paintings in
question. The court also noted that the auction procedure merely was
to announce at the beginning of the auction that all sales were subject
to the "Conditions of Sale," without making any direct statement about
the disclaimer.
The court decided the knowledge question by invoking a test which
inquires whether "the person . should as a reasonable man understand
that it contains terms of the contract that must be read at his peril." 3
In holding that much more than the auctioneer's statement was required
to draw attention to the "Conditions of Sale," the court indicated that
the auction attracted people on the basis of their interest in owning art,
not on the basis of their legal experience or business sophistication.
Moreover, the court considered it unreasonable to expect a prospective
purchaser to appreciate a disclaimer of "basic information presented
throughout the catalogue in unqualified form with every appearance
of certainty and reliability." 4
62. 325 N.YS.2d at 579.
63. Id. at 580.
64. Id.
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In deciding the effect of the disclaimer, the court also focused on
the defendant's expectation that bidders would rely upon the reputation
of Parke-Bernet and the accuracy of its representations: "The
wording of the catalogue was clearly designed to emphasize the genuine-
ness of the works to be offered." 1r Significantly, in addressing itself to
the "highly technical and legalistic words of disclaimer," the court
found that "[w]here one party in a contractual relationship occupies
a position of superior knowledge and experience, and where that superior
knowledge is relied upon and intended to be relied upon by the other,
surely more is required for an effective disclaimer than appears here." 6
In denying the legal effect of the disclaimer, the court acted "consistently
with a whole body of law that reflects an increasing sensitivity to the
requirements of fair dealing where there is a relationship between
parties in which there is a basic inequality of knowledge, expertness or
economic power." "I
Were this case decided under the Code, it would fall directly within
the provisions of section 2-316(1) To the extent an attempt to con-
strue the express warranty and disclaimer consistently is unreasonable,
the attempted disclaimer is inoperative.
UCC § 2-314 WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY
The codification of the implied warranty of merchantability in sec-
tion 2-314 has given consumers a highly flexible remedy to redress the
infliction of personal injury 6 Particularly important for the protection
65. Id. at 581.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 582.
68. Section 2-314 provides:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller
is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section
the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the
premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description;
and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within
the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind,
quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved;
and
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of art consumers is the question whether section 2-314 will be inter-
preted to include redress for loss of bargain resulting from the sale of
defective goods.
Section 2-314 (1) establishes that, unless disclaimed, a warranty that
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale by a
"merchant dealer." The scope of the warranty limts liability to a "mer-
chant with respect to goods of that kind;" it is arguable that this cover-
age includes commercial galleries and dealers, and museums which
indulge in the controversial practice of de-accessionmng.
Although developmental case law surrounding section 2-314 primarily
involves personal injury or property damage caused by defective goods,
cases such as Santor v. A. & M. Karagbeustan, lne.69 evidence at least
sporadic judicial willingness to extend implied warranty liability to com-
mercial loss situations. Considering the far-reaching impact that past
art scandals such as the Van Meegeran70 and de Hory7l forgeries and
the discovery of the fake Etruscan Horse in the collection of the Metro-
politan Museum of Art712 have had on the commercial art world, the
application of implied warranty liability to the sale of art would be an
effective means of eradicating the specter of art fakes whether their
transfer is innocent or intentional.
The thrust of section 2-314 is demonstrated by comparing that rem-
edy with the more traditional action for fraudulent representations in-
ducing the sale of goods. In an action for fraud, it generally is necessary
to prove that the seller knew his representation was false. However,
in an action for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, the
seller's knowledge of the existence of a defect is not an essential element
of liability Covering all defects within its scope, whether known to the
seller or not, the 2-314 warranty is a form of strict liability which is
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement
may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the con-
tamer or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied warranties
may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
69. 44 NJ. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). See also Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American
Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962), wich extends the
breach of express warranties to commercial loss.
70. See L. JEvPsoN, supra note 1, at 149.
71. See generally C. IRvING, FrAo (1969).
72. A collection of articles on art forgery appears in 26 BuuMrNm oF ne MmToPoLITAr
MUjsEum oF ART, February, 1968. Most of the articles were prompted by the then-recent
discovery of the fake Etruscan horse.
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applicable even in situations where the seller would be unable" to dis-
cover the defect in the work of art.74 If the goods do not conform to
the contract, the seller's utmost care will not relieve him of liability7 5
Criteria for Establishing Merchantability
The standards for establishing merchantability are enumerated in sec-
tion 2-314 (2) Of foremost importance in applying the warranty of
merchantability to art sales is the criterion of section (2) (a), which
states that "goods to be merchantable must be at least such as pass
without objection in the trade under the contract description." Com-
ment 2 to this section suggests that in the field of art this interpretation
would be made by reference to recognition, categorization, and evalua-
non of specific artists, periods of art, and specific works relating to those
artists and periods.
Obviously, an original, documented work of art would pass without
objection in the trade. But it is less clear what result would follow from
a fake Corot which has passed unnoticed for 100 years.76 Literally,
there has been no objection by the trade in such a situation; neverthe-
less, it is a spurious piece which, when discovered, will work to the fi-
nancial detriment of its purchaser. On discovery of the defect, the work
would be rendered unmerchantable for the purposes of that particular
contract of sale, and section 2-314(2) (a) should provide a remedy
The art industry has attempted to alleviate the possibility of this situ-
ation by standardizing the classification of the degrees of certainty in
attribution.77 In reality, the classification scheme is an attempt to estab-
73. The word "unable" has more practical meaning when defined in terms of the
extreme expense and time required to authenticate most works of art. Coupled with the
reality that expert opimon is rarely unammous, "unable" need not be an absolute in
this context.
74. See, e.g., Vlases v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 377 F.2d 846, 849 (1967) (disease in
chickens was non-detectable by seller, but such fact did not relieve him of the conse-
quences of section 2-314).
75. id. See also Wood v. Hub Motor Co, 110 Ga. App. 101, 137 S.E.2d 674 (1964);
Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 418 P.2d 900 (Okla. 1965), rehearing denied July 11,
1966, application for leave to file second petition for rehearing dened, Oct. 18, 1966.
76. George Savage declares: "The specious argument is often advanced that if a
forgery deceives the critics and experts it Is as valid as the original work. A proper
refutation is that the life of any forgery is rarely more than a generation. Left alone, it
will expose itself merely by existing. A case in which a forgery has been universally
accepted is virtually unknown. Even the best of forgeries can hardly be said to exist
on the same plane as a genuine work of art." G. Savage, supra note 4, at 10.
77. If the artist's surname alone is mentioned in a catalogue, the merchant implicitly is
saying that the question of attribution is far from resolved, and in his opinion the work
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lish a built-in disclaimer system for the protection of the art merchant;
the classification purportedly operates as a vehicle of nonce to prospec-
tive purchasers. This method of imbuing the transaction with integrity
does not provide for all contingencies which may arise. Section 2-314
(2) (a) could provide an effective remedy; when the defect is discovered,
it still can be shown to have been unmerchantable.
Another test for determining merchantability which may afford an
alternate means of protecting the disappointed purchaser from the loss
of his bargain is found in section 2-314(2) (c), which states: "Goods to
be merchantable must be at least such as . are fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such goods are used." Comment 8 elaborates:
"[M]erchantable goods must therefore be 'honestly' resalable in the
normal course of business because they are what they purport to be."
A forgery certainly would defeat the purpose of buying an original and
assuredly would not be "honestly resalable" as an original. Whether the
purchase was motivated by an aesthetic sense or by the ever-increasing
desire to obtain a financial investment, the provisions of section 2-314
(2) (c) and comment 8 make it apparent that there is a breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability in the sale of a forged piece.
Section 2-314 (2) (f) provides another standard for defining mer-
chantability The goods must be such as "conform to the promises or
affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any." Paintings
often are sold in frames displaying brass or wooden plaques which recite
the title of the work and to whom it is attributed. If such a plaque is
regarded as a label, and if the painting and the plaque are inconsistent,
a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability would arise.
Viewing the artist's signature as a label within the purview of subsec-
tion (2) (f) is even more significant. A forged signature would breach
the warranty of merchantability; and where the painting was, in fact, an
original, but the signature had been added fraudulently to improve sala-
bility or artistic importance, the purchaser should recover for any dif-
ference in value between an unsigned and a signed original.
Prlnty
The UCC makes no provision with respect to the seller's liability to
is "of the artst's school," "by one of his apprentices," or "in his manner or style." The
addition of the artst's initials to the surname indicates that the work is "of the period"
of the artist, which may be in whole or in part the efforts of the artist. When the
work is listed with the first name or names in addition to the surname, it is considered
that the work is "by the artist."
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a subpurchaser. Comment 3 to section 2-318 declares that the Code
position is "neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the devel-
oping case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who
resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain." The modem
trend is away from privity and toward foreseeability as the criterion for
liability In Virginia, for example, legislation has dispensed with both
horizontal and vertical privity and has extended liability beyond per-
sonal injury to property damage and loss of bargain.7 8 The Oregon
courts have indicated an alternative method of dispensing with privity
In State ex rel. Western Seed Production Corp. v. Campbell,79 for ex-
ample, an implied warranty was not considered a bargained-for pro-
vision; liability under such a warranty thus is imposed by law and is
essentially tortious rather than contractual. It would be immaterial,
therefore, whether the defendant is a remote or immediate seller. More-
over, if advertising is involved, an additional argument for dispensing with
privity arises. In a personal injury action in Lonzrick v. Republic Steel
Corp.,0 the court stated that, although advertising by the manufacturer
is a reason for not requiring privity when the consumer sues the manufac-
turer, the absence of advertising by the manufacturer does not bar such
action by the purchaser. Likewise, in an action for transfer of fake art
the remote purchaser should be able to dispense with privity on the basis
of advertisements; 81 even in the absence of advertising, it is submitted that
lack of privity should not preclude recovery. In any case where it is
reasonably foreseeable that the breach of the warranty of merchantabil-
ity will cause an economic loss to the ultimate consumer, the remote
seller should be held liable for such loss.82
Disclaimer
The warranty of merchantability may be disclaimed, but such dis-
claimer requires special precaution.8" A disclaimer of this warranty may
78. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.2-318 (Added Vol. 1965); 8-654.4 (Cum. Supp. 1972). See
Speidel, The Virgima "Atti-Printy" Statute: Strict Products Liability Under the Um-
form Commercial Code, 5i VA. L. Rnv. 804 (1965).
79. 250 Or. 262, 442 P.2d 215 (1968).
80. 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966).
81. Judge Fuld in Randy Kmtwear stated: "Today, the significant warranty
is frequently that given by the manufacturer through mass advertising to consumers
with whom he has no direct contractual relationslup." 11 N.Y.2d 5, 12, 181 N.E.2d 399,
402, 226 N.YS.2d 363, 367 (1962).
82. ANDERsoN, supra note 41, § 2-314:141.,
83. UlirORm COMMERCmaL CODE § 2-314, Comment 11.
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be oral or in writing; if written, it must be conspicuous and must ex-
pressly mention merchantability. 4 The implied warranty of merchan-
tability also may be excluded by general language which informs the
buyer that he assumes the entire risk of the quality of the goods; this
may be accomplished by such statements as "with all faults," or "as is." I
Courts are reluctant to give effect to any language of disclaimer, par-
ticularly in the case of the implied warranty of merchantability Buyers
frequently are relieved of the onerous burdens of a disclaimer by a
finding of unconscionability 6 or a determination that the disclaimer was
not sufficiendy conspicuous.87
The warranty of section 2-314 also may be precluded by the pur-
chaser's inspection or failure to inspect.88 However, this rule applies only
to defects which could be revealed by reasonable inspection. What con-
stitutes a reasonable inspection is determined by the skill of the buyer and
the time and facilities available to him. The purchaser of a forged
painting should not be precluded by his inspection from asserting a for-
gery that he could not have discovered without using the tools of
advanced technology or extensive research.
UCC 2-315 WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
A cause of action of special importance both to the novice art con-
sumer and to the educated purchaser can be found in section 2-315,'
which establishes an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
Although the usual fact situation involves a merchant seller, comment
4 to 2-3 15 indicates that the warranty can arise as to nonmerchant sellers
when it is justified by the circumstances. As in the cases of the warranty
of merchantability and express warranty, the seller's intention to create
a warranty is immaterial, and good faith is no defense.91 Likewise, the
84. UNIFORM COMMERICA. CODE § 2-316 (2).
85. UNIFOMvI COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316 (3) (a).
86. UNIFoRM CoMMERCIAL CODE §2-302.
87. UNIFOaM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-316 (2), 1-201 (10).
88. Intrastate Credit Serv., Inc. v. Pervo Paint Co., 236 Cal. App. 2d 547, 46 Cal. Rptr.
182 (1965).
89. Id.
90. Section 2-315 provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any par-
ticular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is
relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods,
there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an implied
warranty" that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
91. ANDERSON, supra note 41, § 2-315:9.
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fact that the defect is difficult to discover does not eliminate the warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose if the warranty otherwise is created.92
Warranty liability under section 2-315 arises "where the seller at
the nine of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for
which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's
skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods. " 91 To constitute
a breach of this warranty, three requirements must be met. Imtially, the
seller must know of the buyer's particular purpose. An explicit state-
ment of purpose by the buyer is unnecessary if the circumstances are
such that the seller should realize the purpose. Secondly, the seller must
have actual or constructive knowledge that the purchaser is relying on
his skill. Finally, the buyer must actually rely on the seller.
Care must be taken to insure that the purchaser's claim is based on a
particular purpose apart from the purpose contemplated by the warranty
of merchantability Comment 3 to section 2-315 distinguishes between
"particular" and "ordinary" purposes. Basically, a particular purpose
within the meaning of section 2-315 "envisages a special use by the buyer
which is peculiar to the nature of his business," whereas an ordinary
purpose envisages a use "customarily made of the goods in question." A
purchaser who is motivated generally by investment potential will not
invoke the 2-315 warranty; nor would a purchaser whose primary pur-
pose was merely to own a work by a given artst. If, however, the
purchase is undertaken to secure a particular investment or gift or to
complete a specific collection, the particular purpose required by section
2-315 may be present.
It is possible to envisage the operation of these concepts in the context
of art forgery If, for example, a prospective purchaser wishes to acquire
a specific painting or a painting by a particular artist for the purpose of
completing a collection, or for a certain gift or investment based on pub-
lic demand for work by that artist or period, and if the seller is aware
of that purpose, and in addition is cognizant of the purchaser's reliance
on his professional skill to provide a quality of goods commensurate
with the purchaser's need, the transfer of a forgery, or anything other
than that which was bargained for, would constitute a breach of the
warranty for a particular purpose.
92. Id.
93. UNwORm COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315.
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CONCLUSION
Art forgery has been called the "indispensable concomitant of art
collecting."914 It is a self-contradictory exercise in ultimate devotion,
"resulting as it does in the complete effacement of the maker." 95 Efforts
to prevent forgery probably never can be totally successful; as a result,
there is a need to provide a means to compensate the victims of the
inevitable art fraud. The Uniform Commercial Code can afford an ef-
fective remedy for art fraud. The warranty provisions of sections 2-313,
2-314, and 2-315 are existing remedies which, if applied creatively, can
provide the broad-based shield necessary for continued scientific, schol-
arly, and legislative advancement in the eradication of art forgery Some
of the proposals set forth herein are innovative in theory and applica-
tion and may or may not enjoy judicial support. What is important,
however, is recognition by the legal and commercial art communities
of the urgent need for the emergence of a metamorphosed concept of
Code warranties-an expanded concept more realistic in light of modern
commercial art transactions. Only when the specter of art fraud and
forgery is challenged and contained will the commercial art industry
dwell in a relatively clean market, and only then will purchasers of art,
whether avant garde or Antique, be able to rejoice unencumbered in
the aesthetic fulfillment and pride in ownership of those works.
94. H. TmEzE, GENuiE AND FALSE 74 (1948).
95. id.
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